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ABSTRACT
The politics of fiscal consolidation in thirteen European countries are statistically
analysed. Based on the political economy literature, political factors are identified
that explain for the consolidation. Variables are selected representing strength of
government and political orientation, and fiscal consolidation is distinguished into
spending cuts and cuts in administration. The statistical analysis of political explana-
tions for cutbacks hardly yields significant results and nor does the analysis of fiscal and
economic effects of consolidation. The analysis of political effects of consolidation does
lead to significant results. Some earlier political economic findings are not supported
for our sample of thirteen European countries.
KEYWORDS Fiscal consolidation; cutback management; politics and government; strength of government;
political orientation; fiscal and economic effects; electoral effects; European countries; statistical analysis
Introduction
How did thirteen large and smaller countries in Western, Southern and Eastern
Europe – Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom – manage the
fiscal crisis, that is, how did they manage to cut back their excessive budget deficits
and debt accumulation in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and great
economic recession?
While the fiscal crisis and consolidation have largely been studied from an
economic perspective (Posner and Blöndal 2012), our primary interest is in the
political aspects of the national governments’ budget consolidations. Earlier we
have analysed ‘the politics of fiscal consolidation in Europe’ by means of qualitative
country case-studies in the thirteen European countries (Kickert, Randma-Liiv, and
Savi 2013). In Kickert and Randma-Liiv (2015), a first attempt was made to supple-
ment the wealth of qualitative data from the in-depth country case-studies with
quantitative statistical analysis. In this article, we fully concentrate on the quantitative
statistics of the politics of fiscal consolidation and elaborate that earlier attempt with
political economic insights. Let us first briefly explain the earlier study.
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In the seventh work package of the European Union (EU)-subsidized research
project ‘Coordination for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future’ (COCOPS),
researchers in European countries provided in-depth country case-studies on the
‘political effort’ of governments to manage the cutbacks (Kickert, Randma-Liiv, and
Savi 2013). That ‘political effort’ was interpreted in terms of the governments’ cut-
back decision-making. In the cutback management literature (Raudla, Savi, and
Randma-Liiv 2015), the most basic distinction was the one between across-the-
board cuts and targeted cuts. Across-the-board measures refer to cuts in equal
amounts or percentages, while targeted cuts mean that some face a larger cut than
others. This dichotomy between rational-comprehensive and incremental decision-
making (Lindblom 1959) has been further elaborated by Peters, Pierre, and Randma-
Liiv (2011), and it was used by us to distinguish three decision-making variables: ‘size
of cutback decisions’, ‘speed of cutback decisions’ and ‘across-the-board versus
targeted decisions’. These were measured in the COCOPS country case-studies.
The next step was to address the possible political explanations of the cutback
decision-making. Of course, the cutback decisions were primarily related to the state
of the public finances in a country. However, they also depended on the type of
politics and government? Did cutback decisions depend on governments being a
single-party one or a multi-party coalition? Did it matter whether governments had a
grand parliamentary majority or only a minority? Did they depend on the govern-
ments being right-wing, centre or left-wing? The in-depth country case-studies
resulted in a wealth of qualitative data. We wanted to complement that with a
quantitative statistical analysis. That attempt (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2015) largely
failed due to limitations of the thirteen country-data, such as low sample totals and
indistinctive variables. The mainly qualitative variables hardly allowed for relevant
quantitative statistics. An alternative quantitative approach had to be found else-
where, for which we now turn our attention to the political economy literature on
fiscal deficits.
In this article, we derive an analytical framework for analysing the influence of
politics and government on cutback management (economists rather use the term
‘fiscal consolidation’) from the political economic literature. Based on the political
economic insights into fiscal deficits and its findings about the influence of politics
and government on budget stabilization (Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi 2006;
Brender and Drazen 2008, Eslava 2011; Hallerberg, Strauch, and Von Hagen
2009; Persson and Tabelini 2003), variables are selected representing the ‘strength
of government’ and the ‘political orientation of government’. Based on the political
economic findings about the effects of the composition of fiscal consolidation on
budget deficit reduction (Alesina and Ardagna 2010; Alesina 2012), consolidation
is distinguished into ‘spending cuts’ and ‘cuts in administration’. Subsequently, the
political economic findings on ‘electoral effects’ of governments’ fiscal tightness,
that is, whether voters punish or reward fiscally tight incumbents at general
elections (Drazen 2001; Eslava 2011), are reviewed.
Our analysis of the political aspects of fiscal consolidation is twofold. First, we
focus on the explanatory power of political factors in explaining fiscal consolidation.
Second, we focus on the political-electoral effects of fiscal consolidation. Did govern-
ments loose the elections due to fiscal cutback measures? Were early elections called
due to cutbacks? Did coalitions fall apart due to cutbacks? The core variable is the
(size and composition of) fiscal consolidation, for which we rely on the data
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presented in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD
2012) cross-country survey.
So the first research question is:
What political factors explain for the size and composition of fiscal consolidation?
And the second research question is:
What are the political effects of fiscal consolidation?
As mentioned before, we are primarily interested in the political aspects of fiscal
consolidation. It is, however, evident that economic factors play a predominant role.
After all, the state of the public finances prior to the fiscal crisis is the primary
explanatory factor for the fiscal consolidation efforts that governments undertook,
and likewise is the primary intended effect of fiscal consolidation – the reduction of
budget deficit and debt accumulation and hopefully also economic recovery. So
besides the political factors, we also pay due attention to these economic factors.
The analytical framework of both the ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ of fiscal consolida-
tion is outlined in Scheme 1.
Analytical framework: political economy of fiscal consolidation
As mentioned in the introduction, our attempt at direct statistical analysis of the
thirteen country case-studies (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2015) failed due to metho-
dological limitations of the data. For a statistical analysis, we therefore looked for
other well-defined and quantitatively measurable variables. These can be found in the
political economy literature; for example, the variables ‘strength of government’ and
its ‘political orientation’. In this section, we review the political economic literature
and see what variables could possibly be utilized. In the next section, we specify the
empirical sources of the selected variables and present the data.
Political orientation of government
Political decisions of governments on fiscal policy can be related to the political
orientation of governments (Cusack 1999, 2001; Eslava 2011). Simply stated, right-
wing governments tend to run lower deficits that left-wing ones. Conservative and
liberal parties tend to advocate more and quicker balancing of the books than
socialists, social democrats or progressive liberals. Cusack (1999) mentioned several
reasons why this ‘conventional wisdom’ might be questioned. There is little empirical
evidence. Some suggest that it is the other way around. Still others suggest that
partisan politics and fiscal policy is rather dependent on economic circumstances.
Economic
Budget deficit
Volume of consolidation
Composition consolidation
Expenditure cuts
Operationalmeasures
Revenue increases
Political
Political orientation
Margin of majority
Number of parties
Herfindahl index
Fiscal Consolidation
Fiscal and economic
Budget deficit
GDP-growth
Explanatory Factors Effects of Consolidation
Political effects
Electoral
Scheme 1. Analytical Framework.
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 177
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ras
mu
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
2:4
8 0
7 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
Left-wing parties will follow a counter-cyclical policy of fiscal stimulus when the
economy recedes. Right-wing parties follow a pro-cyclical policy of fiscal tightness in
hard economic times. Another counter-argument is that in small internationally open
economies it is rather the international world markets than domestic fiscal policy that
affects the domestic economy, whatever the political orientation of governments.
Evidence can be found that partisan politics and fiscal policy is contingent on
economic conditions (Cusack 1999), and that left-wing governments adopt coun-
ter-cyclical fiscal policies while right-wing ones chose pro-cyclical policies (Cusack
2001). But empirical support for the ‘partisan cycle’ hypothesis of Hibbs (1977), that
preferences of left-wing politicians for large governments that stimulate economic
activity are expected to translate into fiscal deficits when they are in power, while the
opposite can be expected when right-wing politicians are in power, is weak (Eslava
2011). A recent study of Armingeon (2012) found evidence that the political colour of
governments does not matter much in fiscal responses to the current economic crisis.
Remark that our sample consists of a mere thirteen countries and that in our case
fiscal policies were adopted against the background of the worldwide banking crisis
and economic recession.
Strength of government
In majoritarian political systems one single party wins a parliamentary majority at the
general elections and forms a single-party government. In multi-party consensual sys-
tems no single party obtains a parliamentary majority. Parliamentary decisions are
reached by compromises between a number of parties (Lijphart 1977, 1984). A single-
party government allegedly is better capable to take swift and drastic decisions than a
multi-party coalition government. Furthermore, a sub-distinction can be made within
governments between a grand (more than two-thirds) parliamentary majority, a simple
(minimal-winning, more than half) majority and a parliamentary minority (less than
half). Minority coalition governments tend to face major problems in taking hard and
unpopular decisions because they have to reach a compromise not only between coali-
tion parties but also with opposition parties.
In the literature on political economy of fiscal deficits and consolidation (Eslava 2011;
Price 2010) a number of arguments have been made and empirically tested about the
influence of types of government upon the stabilization of large budget deficits. The basic
argument is that when a government is ‘strong’, the likelihood of budget deficit reduc-
tions becomes higher. Presidential systems tend to lead to better spending and deficit
stabilization than parliamentary systems, and proportional election systems (consensual
democracies with coalition governments) tend to generate higher spending and higher
deficits than majoritarian ones (single-party governments) (Persson and Tabelini 2003;
Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi 2006). Furthermore, the larger the majority of the ruling
party (or parties), the ‘stronger’ the government is in overruling opposition parties. The
margin of parliamentary majority (minority, minimal winning, grand) is an indicator of
‘strength’. Empirical evidence from OECD countries showed that single-party govern-
ments run lower budget deficits than coalition governments (Alesina, Ardagna, and
Trebbi 2006; Armingeon 2012).
Furthermore, the more different parties have different preferences to spend on
different public goods, and the higher the level of polarization between the different
parties, the higher the chance that budget deficits will increase (Eslava 2011). The
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political economic literature on fiscal rules and institutions (Von Hagen 2006;
Hallerberg, Strauch, and Von Hagen 2009) suggests that the number of actors
participating in the budgeting process negatively affects the fiscal discipline. This
type of fragmentation of government has been proxied by the number of parties
represented in the coalition and by the number of spending ministries (Wehner
2010).
Composition of fiscal consolidation: spending cuts versus tax increases
The political economic literature on deficit reduction teaches us that the dis-
tinction in fiscal consolidation between tax increases and spending cuts is highly
relevant. There is ample evidence that fiscal consolidation based on spending
cuts rather than tax increases is more likely to reduce deficits. Moreover,
consolidation on the spending side rather than the tax side is less likely to
create economic recessions (Alesina and Ardagna 2010). These findings of the
OECD countries between 1970 and 2007 have been reconfirmed after the recent
economic recession (Alesina 2012; Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi 2014).
Economic policy-makers utilize these findings in the debate how much conso-
lidation is needed, how fast and with which instruments. In a series of OECD
Economic Department working papers about these questions (Sutherland,
Hoeller, and Merola 2012), it was once again empirically confirmed that spend-
ing-driven fiscal adjustments are more likely to reduce deficit and stabilize debt
than tax-driven ones (Molnar 2012; Blöchliger, Song, and Sutherland 2012). The
OECD (2012) cross-country analysis of fiscal consolidations also stipulated the
preference for spending cuts over tax rises. And a paper prepared by Alesina
(2010) for a meeting of the EU Ministers of Finance also emphasized the higher
effectiveness of spending cuts in deficit and debt stabilization.
Spending-based fiscal adjustments are not only more likely to reduce the deficit and
debt than tax-based adjustments, they are also less likely to trigger an economic reces-
sion. Based on an examination of European countries, the Heritage Foundation analyst
Furth (2014) concluded that deficit reductions by spending cuts are much less harmful to
economic growth than tax increases. Spending-based fiscal consolidation can even
contribute to economic growth when accompanied by cutbacks in the costs of admin-
istration, that is, cuts in public sector size and pay (Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi 2014).
Fiscal and economic effects of fiscal consolidation
Fiscal consolidation measures are taken to reduce budget deficits and debt accumulation.
As mentioned just before, spending cuts are more likely to reduce budget deficits than tax
increases. And spending cuts accompanied by reforms, especially cuts in the size and
costs of administration, are supposedly even more beneficial. The consolidation mea-
sures, imposed by the Troika upon Greece since 2010, are a harsh example of that latter
conviction.
The economic effects of fiscal consolidation are politically contested. Left-wing politi-
cians argue that hard consolidation and cutbacks will likely result in worsening the
economy, especially when the economy already is in recession. That actually was the
case in most Western countries at the time of the fiscal crisis. As mentioned before,
there is empirical evidence that spending-based consolidations are less likely to cause
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economic decline than tax increases, and that cuts in administration also help prevent
economic recession.
Political-electoral effects of public spending
In the political economy literature, the subject of opportunistic partisan manipulation
of government spending before elections, in order for incumbent politicians to get re-
elected, has specifically been studied. Following one of the pioneering works
(Nordhaus 1975), the subject is called ‘political business cycle’ and received extensive
attention (Drazen 2001). The hypothesis is that partisan policy-makers will determine
macro-economic cycles (Hibbs 1977). The argument runs that voters value public
spending, that is, economic expansion, but underestimate the costs of the future
taxes. Therefore, voters support policy-makers who favour public spending, resulting
in deficits, and oust incumbents who are fiscally tight (Eslava 2011: 647). This line of
argument has been criticized theoretically and refuted empirically (Alesina, Perotti,
and Tavares 1998). Politicians are not merely opportunistic voter-maximizing spen-
ders who ignore social welfare. Voters are not always ignorant of the long-term
consequences of budgetary decisions. Empirical studies of OECD countries show that
bigger budget transparency leads to lower deficits and debt levels. Many empirical
studies of the opportunistic use of budget deficits during election times have been
carried out. No empirical evidence was found of pre-electoral fiscal spending in a
large sample of countries, developed and less developed economies, parliamentary
and presidential systems, proportional and majoritarian election systems (Brender
and Drazen 2008, Persson and Tabelini 2003). And the assumption that fiscally
conservative incumbents loose elections has been empirically refuted (Alesina,
Perotti, and Tavares 1998). In advanced economies and democracies with budget
transparency, voters tend to be fiscally conservative. Incumbents that follow a fiscally
tight policy of deficit consolidation and spending cuts are not more likely to be
ousted at elections than fiscally loose incumbents (Eslava 2011).
Empirical variables, sources and data
After deriving various relevant variables from the political economic literature, in this
section we specify which variables are selected, what the empirical sources of the
variables are, and we present the data used for the statistical analysis.
Strength of government and political orientation
Three quantitative variables representing the ‘strength’ of a government are selected from
the World Bank database on political institutions (World Bank 2012) (see Table 1): first,
the margin of the government’s parliamentary majority (less than 0.50 is minority, more
than 0.50 is simple (minimal-winning) majority, more than 0.66 is grand majority);
second, the number of parties in government; and third, the more sophisticated
Herfindahl index of government (the sum of square seats of all parties in government).
The Herfindahl extremes are a huge number of very small parties (index 0) versus one
single party (index 1). The Herfindahl indexmeasures not only the number of parties but
also their parliamentary size, and therefore offers a more refined indicator of ‘strength’
than the mere number of parties.
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Furthermore, the political orientation of governments is measured: right-wing is
denoted as 1, centre 2, and left-wing 3. A centre-right coalition is denoted as 1.5, and a
centre–left one as 2.5. A right–centre–left coalition is denoted as 2. These data are derived
from the COCOPS country case-studies (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2015) (see Table 1).
Volume and composition of consolidation
For the quantitative analysis of fiscal consolidation (see Table 2), we rely upon the
data presented in the OECD (2012) survey. The OECD defines fiscal consolidation as
concrete and active policies aimed at reducing government deficits and debt accu-
mulation, not mere announcements of targets without specific plans. The OECD
survey was based on self-reporting by governments, that is, data reported by the
Table 1. Government characteristics.
Government right–
centre–left
Government margin
majority
Number parties in
government
Herfindahl
index
Belgium 2 0.64 5 0.184
Estonia 2 0.59 3 0.395
France 1 0.57 1 0.877
Germany 1.5 0.61 3 0.529
Hungary 1 0.68 1 1
Iceland 3 0.53 2 0.515
Ireland 2.5 0.68 2 0.559
Italy 1.5 0.54 3 0.674
Lithuania 1.5 0.56 4 0.385
The Netherlands 1.5 0.46 2 0.435
Slovenia 3 0.48 4 0.512
Spain 3 0.48 1 1
The United
Kingdom
1.5 0.55 2 0.734
Source: World Bank (2012) and COCOPS country case-studies.
Table 2. Volume and composition of fiscal consolidation.
Consolidation
volume
(% of GDP)
Expenditures
reduction
(% of total)
Operational
measures
(% of total)
Revenues
increase
(% of total)
Belgium 4.3 48.0 10.1 52.0
Estonia 2.6 0.0 0.0 100.0
France 4.2 59.0 30.0 41.0
Germany 3.0
Hungary 8.2 87.0 40.0 13.0
Iceland 9.1 78.7 26.6 21.3
Ireland 17.9 66.0 6.0 34.0
Italy 6.1 49.0 6.5 51.0
Lithuania 5.5
The Netherlands 2.9 93.4 38.8 6.6
Slovenia 6.0 100.0 48.9 0.0
Spain 7.3 66.6 21.4 33.4
The United
Kingdom
7.1 77.0 23.0
Source: country profiles in OECD (2012).
Note: Lithuania is not an OECD member and therefore not included in the OECD survey. Nakrošis, Vilpišauskas,
and Kuokštis (2015) reported that Lithuania had a fiscal consolidation plan of 5.5 % GDP in 2011. Figures
conforming the OECD format are not available.
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various governments in response to a questionnaire sent out to countries in
December 2011 by the OECD Senior Budget Officials Group. The time horizon of
fiscal consolidation plans in most countries was limited to 2015. The data were
presented with a cumulative impact over the consolidation period (OECD 2012: 3).
We define the variable ‘volume of fiscal consolidation’ as the final accumulated
consolidation in 2015. Virtually, all consolidation plans were back-loaded, that is,
the measures were annually growing and the maximum consolidation efforts were
planned for the later years. Estonia was the exception, where the consolidation
plans were front-loaded, meaning that the maximum effort took place right at the
outset of the crisis. Since 2009, Estonia gradually withdrew from consolidation
(OECD 2012: 36). In the end, the 2015 accumulated volume of consolidation in
Estonia was relatively low.
Besides the ‘volume of fiscal consolidation’, we also consider the composition of
the fiscal adjustment measures, that is, the share of expenditures reduction (spending
cuts) and the share of operational measures (cuts in the costs of administration) in
the total consolidation (OECD 2012).
Electoral effects
Data about the electoral effects of the government’s fiscal consolidation plans are
derived from the COCOPS country case-studies (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2015). The
third column of Table 3 indicates whether the general elections were lost by the
incumbent government. The fourth column denotes whether the general elections
were early calls, while the fifth column indicates whether the call for early elections
was related to the fiscal consolidation plans of the government. The sixth column
indicates whether a coalition government was reduced to a parliamentary minority
Table 3. Electoral effects of fiscal consolidation.
General
elections
Incumbents lost
election
Early
elections
Related to
cutbacks
Coalition turns
to minority
Related to
cutbacks
Belgium 2010 Yes Yes No Yes No
Estonia 2007 Yes 2009 no 2009 yes Yes
2011 No No
France 2007 Yes No
2012 Yes No
Germany 2009 Yes No
Hungary 2010 Yes No
Iceland 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ireland 2011 Yes Yes Yes
Italy 2011 Yes Yes Yes
Lithuania 2008 Yes 2009 no
2012 Yes No
The Netherlands 2010 Yes Yes Yes
2012 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Slovenia 2008 Yes No
2011 Yes Yes Yes
Spain 2012 Yes Yes Yes
The United
Kingdom
2010 Yes No
Frequency counts All but 1 8 out of
18
All but 1 4 times 3 times
Source: COCOPS country case-studies.
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due to the withdrawal of one or more coalition parties, while the last column indicates
whether that walk-out of parties from the coalition was related to the government’s
fiscal consolidation plans. The bottom row of the table presents the summary counts of
the electoral effects.
Explanations of fiscal consolidation
Economic explanations
The first and foremost explanatory factor for the fiscal consolidation efforts that
national governments took to manage the fiscal crisis is the fiscal and economic
situation prior to and during the crisis. The worse the economic situation (GDP
growth rate, unemployment, etc.) and the worse the fiscal situation (budget deficit,
state debt, etc.), the more drastic measures had to be taken by governments.
Figure 1 confirms that the size of the fiscal consolidation plans was indeed related
to the state of the public finances in previous years. The volume of fiscal consolida-
tion is significantly correlated (explained variance of 83 per cent) to the average
budget deficits in the preceding period (Eurostat), beginning in the year 2008 when
the banking sector collapsed, the main trigger of the global financial-economic crisis.
The correlation is hardly surprising as the main objective of the consolidation in
most European countries was to bring the excessive deficit back to the EU ceiling of 3
per cent.
Political explanations
Political orientation of government (right–center–left)
The hypothesis that right-wing governments tend to take harder fiscal consolidation
measures than left-wing governments is empirically refuted in our thirteen European
countries (Figure 2). The left-wing government in Iceland and left–centre government in
Ireland actually took drastic fiscal consolidation measures. The right-wing Hungarian
government did take relatively hard measures, but the French did not. The main explana-
tion why the left-wing governments in Spain, Iceland and Ireland did take large consolida-
tion measures, contrary to the hypothesis, was their dependence on the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), EU and European Central Bank loan programmes. Whatever
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Figure 1. Consolidation volume – average budget deficit.
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data and OECD (2012).
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their political orientation, they had no choice but to carry out the prescribed and imposed
budget cuts.
Strength of government
The assumption derived from the literature is that governments with a parliamen-
tary minority are seriously hampered in taking bold action, while governments with
a grand (two-thirds) majority are hardly hindered by political opposition. Figure 3
shows that the political assumption holds for the minority and grand majority
cases. There is no correlation (R2 is only 0.13) with the volume of fiscal consolida-
tion for the normal winning majority (between 0.50 and 0.66) cases. Higher degrees
of majority for that in-between range did not lead to higher consolidation
measures.
The correlations between the volume of consolidation and the two indicators of
political fragmentation (strength of government) – the number of parties in govern-
ment and the Herfindahl index of government – only provide weak evidence. The
volume of consolidation slightly (but insignificantly) drops with increasing number
of coalition parties, and similarly with decreasing Herfindahl index. ‘Weaker’ govern-
ments seem to carry out less deficit consolidation, thus confirming earlier political
economy findings.
Not only the size but also the composition of deficit reductions matters. The
literature on political economy amply demonstrated that spending cuts are more
R² = 0.1579
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Spain
Figure 2. Consolidation volume – political orientation.
Source: World Bank (2012) and OECD (2012).
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Figure 3. Consolidation volume – government margin of majority.
Source: World Bank (2012) and OECD (2012).
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likely to reduce deficits than tax increases, and that cuts in the costs of admin-
istration are less likely to harm economic growth. In our study, the correlations
between the percentage of expenditure reductions as part of the total volume of
consolidation, with the indicators of government strength, did not possess any
significance. With an increasing number of coalition parties and decreasing
Herfindahl index, the proportion of expenditure cuts seemed to slightly
decrease, though insignificantly. The correlations between the proportion of
operational measures and the indicators of government strength did yield simi-
lar results. The higher the number of parties and the lower the Herfindahl index
(i.e. the ‘weaker’ the government), the lower (slightly and insignificantly) the
proportion of operational measures (see Figure 4). It looks like ‘weaker’ govern-
ments are less inclined to cut in programme expenditures (in public policy
sectors) and also less inclined to cut in the size and pay of the administration’s
workforce.
Figure 4 shows Slovenia on top (the Slovenian government’s consolidation con-
sisted completely of expenditure cuts, half of which were cuts in the administration’s
size and salaries) and Estonia at the bottom with no operational measures. Estonia
front-loaded its consolidation, which initially included a significant share of admin-
istrative cuts, and later withdrew from consolidation (OECD 2012: 36).
Effects of fiscal consolidation
Fiscal and economic effects of consolidation
Budget deficit reduction
The following three figures relate the budget deficit reduction to the volume of
consolidation (Figure 5) and to the composition of consolidation, that is, the percen-
tage of expenditure cuts (Figure 6) and the percentage of operational cutbacks
(Figure 7). As the worst budget deficit in most countries occurred in 2009, we
measured the budget deficit reduction (surplus growth) since then. Because the
volumes of consolidation measured by the OECD (2012) referred to plans which in
most countries represented only the first consolidation round so that subsequent
consolidation rounds (with increasing volumes) were not comprised, we took
account of the budget deficit reduction until 2012 only (Eurostat data on budget
surplus 2009–2012).
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Source: OECD (2012) and World Bank (2012).
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The correlation between the volume of consolidation and the resulting decline of
deficits is positive but not that significant (R2 is 0.33). Figure 5 shows a paradox: both
the country with a modest consolidation effort (Lithuania) and the one with the far
highest effort (Ireland) achieved the highest reduction of budget deficit. However, the
Lithuanian figure of fiscal consolidation effort is not derived from the OECD (2012)
survey but from Nakrošis, Vilpišauskas, and Kuokštis (2015), and is therefore actually
incomparable.
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Figure 5. Consolidation volume – budget deficit reduction.
Source: OECD (2012) and http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data
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Source: OECD (2012) and http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data
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Figure 6 shows that the correlation between budget deficit reduction and the
share of spending cuts in fiscal consolidation is only slightly positive and insig-
nificant (R2 is 0.03). This finding hardly supports the political economic argument
that spending cuts are more likely to result in budget deficit reduction than in tax
increases.
Figure 7 shows that the correlation between deficit reduction and operational
cutbacks is slightly negative (with little significance, R2 is 0.03), which seems to
contradict the political economic argument that reduction in public sector size and
pay is beneficial for deficit reduction and economic growth.
Recovery of economic growth
The size and composition of consolidation are also related to the subsequent economic
recovery, a relationship which is rather dubious from an economic perspective, especially
for small countries with open economies. As the highest GDP decline in most countries
occurred in 2009, we measured the GDP growth since then (Eurostat data on GDP growth
2009–2012).
The correlation between the volume of fiscal consolidation and economic recovery
(see Figure 8) is not only insignificant (the explained variance is a mere 18 per cent)
but, moreover, inverse. The higher the consolidation effort, the lower the economic
recovery, thus supporting the criticism that ‘fiscal austerity’ in weak economies might
harm economic recovery. The figure shows a paradox: the countries with the lowest
consolidation effort (Estonia) and modest effort (Lithuania) reached the largest
economic growth, and the one with the highest consolidation effort (Ireland)
achieved hardly any growth.
The correlation between expenditure reductions and economic recovery is also
inverse and moderately significant, as Figure 9 shows – contradicting the political
economic argument that spending cuts are less likely to lead to economic recession
than increases in tax revenue.
The correlation between operational cutbacks and economic growth is negative
though hardly significant (see Figure 10). The political economic argument that
reduction of government’s size and pay as part of deficit consolidation is less likely
to result in economic recession is contradicted.
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Source: OECD (2012) and http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data
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Political-electoral effects of consolidation
Electoral effects
The findings in political economy about positive electoral effects of tight fiscal
consolidation are unmistakably refuted in our study of thirteen European countries
(see the summary counts in Table 3).
General elections in all but one case (Estonia in 2011) resulted in a defeat of the
incumbent government which had taken steps towards fiscal consolidation. It is
doubtful in some cases whether the economic and fiscal crisis and, particularly, the
fiscal consolidation efforts of the government were the main causes for the electoral
loss. The 2007 general elections in Estonia took place before the financial banking
crisis broke out, and the governments that were newly elected in 2008 in Lithuania
and Slovenia were confronted with the very beginning of the financial crisis. The
2010 elections in Belgium were dominated by the Flanders-Wallonia controversy, and
solving the fiscal crisis was not the foremost priority in the eighteen months of
coalition formation.
In the eight cases where governments had to call early elections, only the Belgian case
was not related to the fiscal crisis. The complex and unstable Belgian political system
regularly results in the fall of governments and early elections. Although Belgium in 2010
was confronted with a severe fiscal crisis, that was not the politically hot issue for the
coalition to break up.
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Figure 9. Expenditure reductions – economic recovery.
Source: OECD (2012) and http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data
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In four countries, the government faced one or more parties leaving the coalition,
which therefore fell back to a parliamentary minority. In Belgium that was not related
to cutbacks, but in all other cases it was. When the Estonian coalition turned into
minority government in 2009, it did not call early elections. In all other cases, govern-
ments did. In Estonia, the centre–right minority coalition was not ousted (the only case
out of seventeen) but actually gained a majority at the 2011 general elections.
Despite the exceptions, we can plausibly conclude from these data that the
electoral effects of governments’ fiscal consolidation decisions were indeed significant
and highly negative for incumbents. This is in plain contrast with the political
economic findings that fiscally conservative incumbents are not punished off at
elections.
Conclusions and discussion
Conclusions
Based on the political economy literature about fiscal deficits and consolidation, and its
findings about the influence of types of government on budget deficit stabilization, a
number of variables were selected representing ‘strength of government’ and ‘political
orientation of government’. Based on the political economic findings on deficit stabi-
lization, we also distinguished ‘spending cuts’ and ‘cuts in administration’, and tested
whether these subcategories of fiscal consolidation correlated with political factors. In
line with earlier political economic findings of weak evidence, it was refuted that right-
wing governments tend to take harder consolidation measures than left-wing govern-
ments. Political colour does not matter. The ‘strength’ of government also hardly
correlated with size of consolidation. Margin of parliamentary majority, number of
government parties and Herfindahl index did not significantly correlate with consoli-
dation. The share of spending cuts in consolidation negatively correlated with the
‘strength of government’ indicators, as did the share of cuts in administration, though
insignificantly both. ‘Weaker’ governments seem less inclined to cut expenditures and
the size and pay of the administration’s workforce.
The statistical analysis of effects of consolidation set out with the fiscal and
economic effects. The correlation between consolidation and subsequent deficit
reduction was positive but hardly significant. The correlation between spending
cuts and fiscal effects was positive but insignificant, though the fiscal effect of cuts
in administration was negative. The political economy argument that spending cuts
are more likely to reduce deficits than tax rises, and that cuts in government size and
pay do likewise, was not supported. The recovery of economic growth was negatively
correlated with consolidation size, and negatively with the share of spending cuts in
consolidation, therefore supporting the criticism that ‘fiscal austerity’ might harm
ailing economies. The political economy argument that cuts in size and pay of
administration are likely to prevent economic recession was refuted.
The analysis of the political effects of fiscal consolidation yielded far more significant
results than the fiscal and economic effects. The electoral effects of the governments’
consolidation efforts turned out to be highly punishing. Incumbents were in all-but-one
cases ousted in general elections because of their consolidation efforts. In more than half
of the cases, governments had to call early elections. In several cases, coalition govern-
ments lost their parliamentary majority due to consolidation plans.
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Altogether, the politics barely seemed to be significant in explaining for size and
composition of fiscal consolidation (also see Appendix 1). However, the political-elec-
toral effects of consolidation were highly significant and in contrast with political
economic findings arguing that tight fiscal policy has positive electoral effects. Notice
though that our sample consists of a mere thirteen countries and that the circumstances
were quite exceptional – that is, a worldwide banking crisis and great economic recession.
Fiscal austerity
A salient political aspect of fiscal consolidation is the question whether harsh fiscal
consolidation – ‘fiscal austerity’ – in times of an economic recession is the right
thing to do. The fervent condemnations by the Nobel Prize-winner Paul Krugman
are well known. The basic argument is that a weak economy will be further
harmed by deficit reductions and that economic growth is a good cure against
deficits, so one had better go for stimulating economic growth instead of cutbacks.
Unfortunately, this debate is often largely political-ideological with debaters pre-
suming to possess the moral right to condemn or justify fiscal consolidation. In
the discussion platform ‘voxEU’, the danger of fiscal austerity leading to another
economic recession was frequently discussed by European economists (Corsetti
2012; De Grauwe 2013; Gros 2011) and top-officials of the IMF (Cottarelli 2012)
and the EU (Buti 2014). The EU’s Directorate-General of Economic and Financial
Affairs has defended itself against accusations and explained its delicate balancing
act (Buti and Carnot 2013). The normative question of success or failure of
consolidation is not only an ideological but also a methodological minefield.
Quantitative and qualitative
Did politics matter in fiscal consolidation? Our qualitative country case-studies provide an
unquestionable ‘yes’ as answer. (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2015). The abundant wealth of
interesting and relevant political facts of the in-depth country case-studies were quite
convincing. The methodological problem, however, is that the uniqueness of country-
specific details does not allow for international comparative generalization. This is why we
went for a quantitative statistical analysis. Unfortunately, our first attempt to derive
quantitative data from the thirteen case-studies only generated indistinct and hardly
informative statistics. The well-known disadvantage of the qualitative case-study method,
was confirmed. For a quantitative statistical analysis, we had to find well-defined and
quantitatively measurable variables elsewhere, that is, in the political economy literature.
The question whether politics mattered in fiscal consolidation, which was most certainly
answered affirmatively with qualitative case-studies, appeared harder to answer with
empirically and methodologically sound statistics based on generalized theory.
Public management
Now what did this statistical analysis of fiscal consolidation mean for public manage-
ment? ‘Fiscal consolidation’ is the somewhat euphemistic term that economists use for
spending cuts and tax increases. In our field of public management and administration,
that activity was used to be called ‘cutback management’ in the 1980s. Actually, we
derived parts of our analytical framework from the literature on cutback management at
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that time (Raudla, Savi, and Randma-Liiv 2015). It seems no exaggeration to state that the
management of the global financial-economic crisis and subsequent fiscal crisis represent
one of the most important challenges for public management today. To study how
governments manage their fiscal crisis is a matter not only of economics but also of
politics and administration. Investigating the size and speed of the government’s fiscal
decision-making, and whether the decision-making was incremental and across-the-
board rather than targeted and political priority-setting, is also part of that.
Fortunately, there are signs that the hard times of cutbacks and retrenchments are
over, and Western economies crept out of recession and are starting to recover.
Though we do not want to make a pessimistic impression, we do remind that the
previous worldwide crises of the 1970s and 1980s were not over in a couple of years.
European governments might well be facing a longer succession of cutback rounds,
which, by the way, will sooner or later force governments to no longer escape their
responsibilities and make fundamental political priorities about public services.
Instead of the current common practice of muddling through with incremental
across-the-board measures, which apparently is what most European governments
are good at (Kickert and Randma-Liiv 2015).
Another comparison with the previous global crises in the 1970s and 1980s also seems
relevant. The oil crisis in the 1970s that led to a worldwide economic recession, was
followed by a fiscal crisis of excessive deficits and debts, forcingWestern governments to
severe cutbacks that dominated Western societies for most part of the 1980s. Western
welfare states became unaffordable. States withdrew from many societal policy sectors,
resulting in the stagnation, retreating and even end of the welfare state. The main focus
was on retrenchments and cutbacks, on managing the fiscal crisis. And ultimately, the
crisis of the 1980s had amajor effect on states and administrations. A common dominant
reform trend emerged all over the Western world, the so-called ‘New Public
Management’. Now what will be the impact of the current fiscal crisis and cutbacks on
states and administrations of today? What will be the impact on reforms in public
administration and management?
Recently, Di Mascio and Natalini (2015) addressed that very question for Southern
European countries. The COCOPS country case-studies we mentioned before have
also addressed this question of the crisis’ impact on reform, soon leading to publica-
tions (Randma-Liiv and Kickert forthcoming).
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Appendix 1. Pearson’s correlations.
Average
budget
deficit
Political
orientation
Government
margin of
majority
Budget deficit
reduction
Economic
recovery
Number
of parties
Consolidation
volume
−0.9150***
(0.0000)
13
0.3733
(0.2090)
13
0.3878
(0.1904)
13
0.5771*
(0.0389)
13
−0.4146
(0.1590)
13
Operational
measures
−0.1752
(0.6282)
10
−0.4195
(0.2274)
10
−0.4993
(0.1418)
10
Expenditure
reductions
0.1825
(0.5912)
11
−0.8036**
(0.0029)
11
(correlation coefficient, level of statistical significance and sample size)
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